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Symposium:  Collective Management of Copyright:  Solution or 
Sacrifice? 
Panel:  Collective Licensing for Digitizing Analog Materials 
Questions and Answers 
Question:  Dick Riddick, Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”).  Both Pam 
Samuelson and Lois Wasoff referred to differences between the United States and 
Europe—small countries versus large countries.  Maybe this is a question for Alain 
Strowel, but also for anybody.  Are you aware of any examples of a successful 
extended collective licensing system where there is not a group of well organized 
author and publisher communities in some sort of an umbrella organization that 
brings those people together so that there can be a comprehensive rights offering?  
And are you aware of any successful examples where there is more than one such 
umbrella, or where there is a licensing mechanism that is divided into fractions as 
opposed to one comprehensive solution? 
Alain Strowel:  I think you put your finger on an important issue.  I think 
extended collective management can work in a special context and it is not just by 
chance that it works quite well in Nordic countries—in Europe—because I think 
we have societies based on consensus.  There is a high level of homogeneity.  You 
have strong collective management organizations (“CMOs”), which are partly ruled 
by transparency and other standards which are rather high there, so you have good 
management.  In addition, I think there is a consensus among the users that they 
should contribute.  I think those societies are partly based on the notion of 
solidarity.  And it is not by chance, again, that those extended collective licenses 
(“ECLs”) have been introduced first in favor of broadcasters.  But in the 1960s, of 
course, those were public broadcasters; they were more willing to pay something.  
And it is the same with the other ECLs—for museums, for national libraries—you 
do not have purely commercial operators there, as well.  So, it becomes a little bit 
different in another context where the users have a different philosophy.  That is 
my problem in relation to the Internet and the expansion of the ECL model outside 
those rather homogeneous contexts where solidarity plays some role and parties 
have accepted the rule of the game, and the rule of the game is to remunerate the 
authors.  It is not that easy in another context. 
Jonathan Band:  I think part of your question was going to the viability of an 
ECL-type model in this country and, just to turn that to the Book Rights Registry, it 
is important to note a couple of things.  One is that the settlement would require 
Google to provide thirty million dollars upfront to the registry to get up and 
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running.1  Now, I do not know if that is enough money, but it is thirty million 
dollars and that sounds like a lot of money to me.  The second thing is that Google 
is already doing this; it is not like you were going to set up a registry and hope that 
the consumers are going to show up and pay.  Google is already offering the 
service, or aspects of the service, and now would be providing more aspects.  I 
think that because it is, to some extent, up and running, the likelihood that there 
would be more revenue flowing in is more certain than in another model where you 
first build the registry and then hope that the customer shows up.  Here, to some 
extent, the customer is already there.  As a result, there might be a slightly greater 
likelihood that there would be revenue coming in that then could help the registry 
work. 
Dick Riddick:  Well, except that a number of people have pointed out that it is 
not just about money—there are other issues, especially for authors. 
Lois Wasoff:  Talking about money for just one second—thirty million is less 
the cost of the notification and certain other costs associated with it.  And the 
notification program had to be repeated on a somewhat reduced level when the 
amended settlement agreement was done.  I bet that money got eaten into pretty 
quickly. 
Audience Member:  It is half gone. 
Lois Wasoff:  So half of it is still there.  There is still fifteen million dollars left, 
but—as we heard this morning—it is enormously difficult to create this database, 
and then to manage it and maintain it.  So, I think that the individuals and 
companies that are looking to get revenue from that Book Rights Registry—if it 
ever gets up and running—are going to be paying those costs pretty soon because 
the Book Rights Registry, when it burns through the first money, will be deducting 
that from its revenues and no one has ever said what that is anticipated to be. 
Eugene Mopsik2:   In regard to orphan works, I just wanted to make it clear that 
American Society of Media Photographers (“ASMP”) was, in fact, a supporter of 
the House version of the orphan works legislation with the diligent search and 
notice of use provisions.3  We did not oppose that, and, in fact, we lobbied for it 
and worked for it.  Beyond that:  Lois, you say that you feel our pain, but it is our 
pain.  So, it is nice that you feel it, but we live with it.  And I listen to you and Pam 
comment on the problems of academic authors, the burdens that they have and their 
need to use materials and their desire to have these materials available to them for 
fair use or no fee.  And I guess that is great for academic authors, who, I presume, 
while they are doing God’s work are being compensated by their universities.  And 
simultaneously, I presume that—for these publications that they create—the 
printers, the distributors and the paper companies are not donating their services.  
So, I find it hard to understand why image producers or illustrators should be 
 
 1. See Amended Settlement Agreement, Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google, Inc., 93 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1159 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (No. 05 CV 8136 (DC)). 
 2. Eugene Mopsik, ASMP, participated as a panelist for Panel 1:  Challenges for Collective 
Licensing Organizations. 
 3. See Orphan Works Act of 2008, H.R. 5889, 110th Cong. (2008). 
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making their contributions. 
Lois Wasoff:  So do I.  I have negotiated college textbook contracts with some 
academic authors; they want to get paid.  Those people want to get paid.  And the 
journal articles—which is the part of the Google corpus where the academic 
authors have assigned their rights and have no further interest at all—you can 
discuss that business model.  There are pros and cons to that.  They are excluded 
from the settlement.  What is in the settlement are books.  Now, with respect to out-
of-print books, if that is what you are referring to then, yes, I see your point; but 
with respect to in-print books, my experience is that academic authors want to get 
paid.  And I believe creators should be paid.  So, when I said I feel your pain, I was 
not being facetious.  I do agree; I understand your position completely.  I think you 
are in a particularly difficult position because of the nature of what you do. 
Eugene Mopsik:  I am not interested in being punitive and I am not interested in 
hammering my clients; obviously, the people that you do that to are not your clients 
for long.  I am interested in some reasonable level of compensation for use.  It is 
really simple.  I am not trying to hammer anybody.  I am not trying to be 
unrealistic.  I understand limitations of remedies.  I get it all.  But free?  Free is 
hard to compete with. 
Pamela Samuelson:  Just so we are clear, I wasn’t arguing for free for 
everything.  I was talking about the out-of-print works that are still in copyright as 
possibly being covered by some sort of extended collective license, which would 
lead to remuneration.  And I have no objection to the photographers and graphic 
people getting part of that remuneration.  So, I just want you to be clear on that.  I 
am not arguing for free on everything. 
Eugene Mopsik:  I do not mean to misinterpret your statements. 
Lois Wasoff:  And, with respect to out-of-print works that are still in copyright, 
you cannot conflate those with orphans.  Very often, there are owners of those 
rights who have a particular personal interest in them because—at least in book 
publishing—the way the work went out of print probably resulted in the rights 
reverting to the author.  And we only barely touched on it, but I think it is a very 
important point.  In this country—regardless of what we are telling WIPO—we do 
not have much of a moral rights regime.  And copyright becomes the tool that is 
used by creators, by authors, to protect some of the interests that—in a country with 
a strong moral rights regime—they might be able to protect through other means.  
One thing that worries me about collective licensing is that it reduces copyright to a 
purely financial right; the money matters, but it really is not all about the money.  
Individual creators and authors, and publishers who are responsible and want to 
manage those creations properly after having acquired rights grants from creators 
and authors, do care about more than just the money. 
Daniel Gervais:  Just a couple of comments.  First of all, it is very clear outside 
the United States that many collectives have a mandate that is far broader than just 
dealing with money.  Actually, a case came out on Wednesday of this week in the 
Court of Appeal of Paris, where Google was sued by a collective representing 
photographers—at least one of the collectives representing photographers—and the 
collective lost the case, because Google found some sort of safe harbor somewhere 
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in French law that no one knew existed.4  But the fact is, the court says that this 
collective has a duty to protect the moral interests of its members in addition to 
their economic interests, so there is a cultural significance.  In addition, it is not 
because there is an ECL that there is a payment.  I can think of several examples, 
but here’s one.  There is a functional equivalent of an ECL in Canada.  The 
Copyright Board of Canada issued a decision in which it covered educational uses 
for photocopying, essentially, and other types of uses.5  The Copyright Board 
covered these uses under the tariff, or under this license, but it considered that a 
certain number of those uses would be fair dealing, so fair use essentially.  The 
Board said it was zero-rating a number of uses because of that; so it is covered 
under the license, but not paid for.  So, it actually removes the doubt as to whether 
or not it is fair dealing.  And I thought it was a fairly elegant solution to cover it 
under the license without having it paid for specifically.  And then, of course, they 
imposed a payment on the rest, and now it is in court. 
Jonathan Band:  I would like to comment on some of the other questions that 
were just asked, or comments that were made.  It seems that the legitimacy of an 
ECL approach to some extent turns on whether there is a justification for the opt 
out model, which is sort of the basic premise or the basic operating principal of an 
ECL.  And I think—at least in the Google Books case—there is a pretty compelling 
argument for an opt out approach.  The large number of works, the enormous 
transaction costs—we are also talking about the way the registry was structured 
under the settlement—applies to these books that are out of print, or not 
commercially available.  At the same time, there is a compelling reason, from an 
academic perspective, to have access those works because of their enormous utility.  
It is really useful to have access to all of those books that are otherwise not being 
used and not generating any revenue for anyone.  In this situation, taking an opt out 
approach is important because otherwise there really is a high likelihood that you 
would have a very incomplete database.  It is entirely possible that in other 
situations there is much less of a justification for an opt out approach.  It could very 
well be that in the music world (although I am certainly no expert in music) it 
would be much harder to justify an opt out ECL approach because you do not 
necessarily have the same kind of compelling social need to a comprehensive 
database that can only be accomplished in an opt out model.  That is an important 
thing if we are talking about ECL and we are talking about an opt out model; it 
really could make a big difference depending on the nature of the material at issue. 
Lois Wasoff:  Jonathan, just to be clear, what you are talking about is opt out, as 
opposed to opt in? 
Jonathan Band:  Right. 
 
 4. See Jean François Bretonnière & Thomas Defaux, Online Copyright Infringement:  When 
Google Images Finally Meets French Law, INTELL. ASSET MGMT. (Mar. 9, 2011), http://www.iam-
magazine.com/reports/Detail.aspx?g=f112ad59-3dda-407e-8e7c-6d06018842a8 (discussing French case 
decided by the Paris Court of Appeals on January 26, 2011). 
 5. See Statement of Royalties to Be Collected by Access Copyright for the Reprographic 
Reproduction, in Canada, of Works in its Repertoire (Can.), available at http://www.cb-
cda.gc.ca/decisions/2009/Access-Copyright-2005-2009-Schools.pdf. 
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Lois Wasoff:  OK.  Not opt out as opposed to not being able to opt out? 
 Jonathan Band:  Right. 
Lois Wasoff:  OK.  That is what I thought. 
Jonathan Band:  Well, that is an option too, I suppose. 
Jane Ginsburg:  Anybody want to rise to that bait? 
Question:  I did not want to rise to that bait, but I had a question.  Maria 
Pallante from the Copyright Office.  Just following up on that, to the extent an opt 
out model might be appropriate for some circumstances—if everybody were to 
stipulate that for a moment—does the panel have views on the relative burden that 
can be placed on the opt out mechanics?  And, for example, how difficult can it be 
on the authors who would have to opt out?  And how does that work in other 
countries?  What examples do we have of good opt out mechanisms that authors 
can live with? 
Alain Strowel:  That is a question for which I did not prepare.  Opt out 
mechanisms that have worked well?  I mean, apart from the ECL models that I 
presented, I do not see anything which comes to mind there.6 Well, we can talk 
about cable retransmission.  I presented it, but I do not have a specific example 
which comes to mind. 
Jonathan Band:  One thought on the ease of opt out.  Initially, prior to the 
litigation, when Google started the library project, it did not have any kind of opt 
out feature at all.  Then the rights holders, especially the publishers, complained, 
and so they started having an opt out.  Google basically said, “If a right holder asks 
us not to scan the work, we will not scan the work,” and so forth.  But, they kept on 
modifying that.  I think initially, they asked for a pretty high degree of proof.  I 
forget the details regarding whether Google required a copyright registration or 
some kind of affirmation on penalty of perjury that the person was the right holder.  
Then the rights holders pushed back and Google adjusted the proof requirement.  
However, I think there were ongoing complaints even after that that it was more 
difficult to opt out than it should be.  Therefore, I think you are absolutely right that 
the opt out needs to be pretty easy for people who are not copyright specialists and 
that you should be able to opt out without having to hire a lawyer. 
Jane Ginsburg:  I would like to pursue this fact question.  Does anybody have 
information responsive to the question of comparative opt out mechanisms?  
Giuseppe?  And can you introduce yourself, even though we will introduce you 
momentarily? 
Giuseppe Mazziotti7:  Yes, I am Giuseppe Mazziotti from the University of 
Copenhagen.  Denmark has been mentioned quite often; I am not Danish, but I 
have some familiarity with the Danish system.  I do not speak Danish either, but 
there is a very good English version of the Danish Copyright Act that I can make 
available.  It is interesting, since it is so crucial in this debate.  While being there, I 
 
 6. See Alain Strowel, The European “Extended Collective Licensing” Model, 34 COLUM. J.L. & 
ARTS 497 (2011). 
 7. Giuseppe Mazziotti, Assistant Professor in Intellectual Property Law, University of 
Coppenhagen, Denmark, participated as a panelist for Panel 3:  Blanket Licensing and Beyond. 
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had the impression that this opt out mechanism is more of a theoretical thing than a 
practical thing because nobody opts out at the end of the day and because it is 
also—as Professor Strowel emphasized several times—the social context which 
matters in my view.  So, in bigger systems, this mechanism could create problems 
in my view.  So, I think it is more of a theoretical thing and not a practical thing.  I 
do not know how much it is used in actuality. 
Lois Wasoff:  I think also—this follows from your point—that the decision to 
opt out is partly fed by what are the advantages of opting out.  And that was 
certainly one of the considerations in the minds of a lot of people in considering 
what to do about the Google Book settlement.  What do you get if you opt out?  
Well, you get the right to sue Google.  Wouldn’t that be a wonderful way to spend 
the next few years of your life?  So, for a lot of smaller, individual authors, and for 
small, specialized publishers opting out—even if they were not happy with many 
aspects of the settlement—there did not seem like a realistic alternative.  So, you 
have to think about what opt out means in terms of the right holder’s future 
activities. 
Giuseppe Mazziotti:  It would be interesting—and I can ask my colleagues—to 
see how often it is used in actuality, because that is the crucial point.  Otherwise, it 
becomes a theoretical issue merely to make the system viable from a purely legal 
perspective without understanding how feasible it is.  And, as you said, leaving the 
author with the opportunity to sue the infringer is theoretical.  Yes, it can be done, 
but it is not convenient for the single right holder, at the end of the day. 
Question:  I do not pretend to be an expert on this, but I think German copyright 
law has this kind of an example for digitization of periodicals, where there is a 
notice requirement and an opportunity for underlying authors to opt out.  They can 
still get royalties if they do not opt out, but Germany really transformed its “no new 
media” provision by introducing this kind of concept.  So, it has allowed 
digitization projects to go forward with an opt out model. 
Jane Ginsburg:  It might be worth clarifying your reference to “no new media.”  
Until very recently, the German copyright law had a provision that said that authors 
could not grant modes of exploitation unknown at the time of entering into the 
contract.8As a result, the standard “all rights now known or later developed” kind 
of grant that is all too common in the United States—and in some other countries is 
permissible, if made explicitly—was until recently, in Germany, just null.  So, even 
if a contract said “unknown future rights,” that was ineffective until the publishers 
lobbied heavily for a change in the law.  And I guess this sounds, at least formally, 
like a bit of a tradeoff, even if not in fact.  Tracey? 
Tracey Armstrong9:  Does Mark want to clarify that? 
Mark:  I believe that the law in Germany does require that the work be available 
 
 8. See SILKE VON LEWINSKI, ALAI EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE—SHORT REPORT ON AMENDMENT 
TO GERMAN COPYRIGHT ACT (2007), available at http://alai.org/ 
index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=41&Itemid=19 (follow “Germany” hyperlink) 
(discussing amendment to section 31(4) of the 1965 German Copyright Act). 
 9. Tracey Armstrong, Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”), participated as a panelist for Panel 
1:  Challenges for Collective Licensing Organizations. 
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online or in digital form before you can opt out of being exploited through that 
collective license. 
Tracey Armstrong:  I was going to talk about a different country, Jane.  I was 
going to talk about the United Kingdom, where the collective licensing 
organization for texts does have an opt out to this question for digital rights.  And 
actually, I think it is an example of an opt out that is not working very well at all.  
That is why I wanted to raise it; it is the opposite of Maria Pallante’s question.  She 
is asking:  where is the opt out method working well?  In the United Kingdom, it is 
not really working well.  There is a provision for it.  Any type of rights holder, such 
as authors and publishers, can opt out, but there is not much transparency regarding 
what they are opting out of.  It is related to digital licensing, digital rights for 
corporate licensing.  And when you think you are opting out of one small sector of 
uses, you are actually opting out of a larger sector.  That is somewhat unclear, and 
you do not realize the results until much further down the line.  We are dealing with 
this right now with many of our clients and that is an enormous market for 
corporate licensing, particularly digital licensing.  Therefore, this is a concern. 
Jane Ginsburg:  Is that a market which could otherwise effectively be exploited 
by individual rights holders? 
Tracey Armstrong:  To some degree.  But to a large degree, there is already 
quite a bit of licensing going on by individual rights holders.  But I think, more 
realistically, that is able to be done more practically by a commercial company than 
by an individual person.  As a result, for those rights holders who are individuals, it 
makes it much harder.  So, the equilibrium just is not there.  That collective 
licensing organization is representing both in this particular case; it is governed by 
a group of publishers:  the Publisher’s Licensing Society (“PLS”) and the Author’s 
Licensing Society, as well.  And those two are kind of the parent organizations of 
this collective licensing body.  So, I think that you do have licensing in the 
market—to address your point—from individual rights holders, but that is usually 
commercials. 
Jane Ginsburg:  David, you had your hand up.  Did you want to speak to this 
question? 
David:  Sure.  In the performance rights organizations’ (“PROs”) consent 
decrees, there is a form of opt out, but of course, the members of the PROs have 
voluntarily opted in in the first place.  But they do have the ability to directly 
license; the members can directly license their works as long as they give the PROs 
notice.  And that can work in particular circumstances if there is a good reason to 
directly license.  But the initial decision, of course, is the right holder’s decision to 
opt in rather than an opt out system.  But you can opt out after the fact and that may 
be something that ought to be considered in other contexts. 
Jane Ginsburg:  I think one of the concerns is the relationship of collective to 
noncollective exploitation.  I think a premise of ECL is that you cannot effectively, 
individually—and by individual, I include corporate owners—license those rights.  
So, an ECL is better than nothing.  But if things change—particularly if the 
technology that created the problem also provides, later on, a solution to the 
problem—then one might be nervous about being locked in to an ECL.  So, if you 
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cannot get out of it at a later date, that might also be a cause for some reluctance to 
go into it in the first place.  Maria, have we been helpful? 
Maria Pallante:  Very much so, thank you. 
Jane Ginsburg:  June? 
June Besek10:  I just wanted to add something to the point about the ease of 
opting out.  At least in some circumstances, the courts have taken into account the 
ease of licensing in deciding the scope of fair use.11So if, in fact, you decide to opt 
out, then you could be exposing yourself to broader fair use unless you have a good 
Plan B for licensing on your own.  And that is something that you have to take into 
account.  So, it might be easy as a mechanical matter, but there may be other 
ramifications to consider. 
Jane Ginsburg:  I think we have time for a couple more questions. 
Question:  I would like to stay on that point.  Regarding Tracey Armstrong’s 
answer to your question, Professor Ginsburg, something is missing.  There is an 
effective opt in regime for collective licensing.  And so, getting back to Maria 
Pallante’s question—which was where does it work and where does it not work, the 
best example is Copyright Clearance Center (“CCC”), which it is purely opt in and 
has an effective corporate licensing structure.  So, opt in does work.  You do not 
always need opt out.  And from a right holder point of view, we collect a lot more 
money from CCC—which is an opt in organization—than we do from any other 
opt out organizations.  Admittedly, it is a larger market, as well.  The issue, again, 
from a right holder perspective, with opt out, is that you sit there and you say: 
“There is this ECL in country X, and I have a choice:  I can stay in and get 
something, or I could opt out and get nothing.  And it is really not much of a 
choice.  It seems much better if I have an opt in because then there is a little bit 
more control and a little bit more responsiveness to rights holders.” 
Audience Member:  Barry Massarsky.  One of my clients, SoundExchange, has 
a very interesting take on this, if I understand it correctly.  You can opt in to be a 
member of SoundExchange by virtue of the compulsory license and, therefore, 
labels and artists could benefit from that relationship.  However, if you do not opt 
in, you are not a member even though those royalties are being collected as 
statutory licenses on your behalf.  SoundExchange has to distribute them anyway, 
as a nonmember.  In other words, it is not clear what the member benefit is, but you 
still get—whether it is an opt out or opt in—the same relative share of distribution 
because the Copyright Office did not want anybody left out of the distribution 
model and wanted to preserve the right of people deciding to be members.  But it is 
 
 10. June Besek, Executive Director, Kernochan Center for Law, Media and the Arts, Columbia 
Law School, served as the moderator for Panel 1:  Challenges for Collective Licensing Organizations. 
 11. See, e.g., BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 430 F.3d 888, 891 (7th Cir. 2005) (noting, after listing 
several legitimate means of obtaining music, including licensed broadcasts:  “[w]ith all of these means 
available to consumers who want to choose where to spend their money, downloading full copies of 
copyrighted material without compensation to authors cannot be deemed ‘fair use.’”); Am. Geophysical 
Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 930 (2d Cir. 1994) (“[S]ince there currently exists a viable market 
for licensing these rights for individual journal articles, it is appropriate that potential licensing revenues 
for photocopying be considered in fair use analysis.”). 
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way too difficult for the licensees to have to pay directly.  So, I guess the agency 
became an intermediary for both the ins and the outs of this particular base. 
Jonathan Band:  I would like to respond to the previous comment.  From a user 
perspective, obviously an opt out is infinitely preferable to an opt in.  Especially 
when you are dealing with a situation like I was describing with the Book Rights 
Registry, where you are dealing largely with a legacy problem, and are dealing with 
works already in existence, rather than a kind of forward-looking model.  So, in 
that situation, when you know that it is highly likely that many rights holders will 
not opt in—largely because it is not worth it to them or they do not even know what 
is going on—then an opt out model is much more preferable from a user 
perspective. 
Audience Member:  Victor Pearlman from American Society of Media 
Photographers.  Expanding on what Jonathan Band just said:  opt in systems work 
great for corporate entities.  The reality is, individual creators will not take any 
action, if that means opting in or opting out.  They are not going to do—by and 
large—anything that requires an action. 
Dick Riddick:  That is true of a lot of things in life, but with respect to what 
Jonathan said, about a legacy situation, I actually agree with that.  The big problem 
with Google is that the nature of the settlement transformed a legacy situation, and 
a subject that might indeed have been plausible under Rule 23.  Rule 23 did not 
exist when I studied the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; I only dimly understand 
it, but since neither the plaintiffs nor the defendants did, I do not see what 
difference that makes.  And you talked, Jonathan, about this being a legacy 
situation; it would be fine if it were, but it has been transformed into something 
else. 
Jonathan Band:  What do you mean?  In what way is it not a legacy situation? 
Dick Riddick:  Well, as the proposed Book Rights Registry now stands, as the 
Google settlement now stands, it is a very audacious, forward-looking business 
model, developed without the consent of many affected parties who have very 
diverse interests and views.  So, it is not a legacy situation; it is more forward-
looking than my former employer’s business plans are. 
Jonathan Band:  Well that might say more about your plans.  But when I used 
the term “legacy,” it was basically focusing on works already in existence with a 
hard cut-off date, as opposed to works that would be contributed in the future. 
Dick Riddick:  Maybe I misunderstand it, but I do not think so. 
Jane Ginsburg:  I do not think we can relitigate the Google Book settlement.  
And we have started to invade the coffee break time. 
 
